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Revitalizing The Maryland 
Wage Compensation Law 
Introduction 
The Maryland Wage Payment and Col-
lection Law, Md. Ann. Code, art. 100, §94 
(1985), provides persons employed within 
the state of Maryland certain rights and 
remedies with respect to the payment and 
collection of wages, fringe benefits and 
other types of employee compensation. 
The principal purpose of the statute is to 
provide assistance to employees seeking to 
recover compensation unlawfully with-
held. The statute also attempts to ensure 
the prompt payment of wages by establish-
ing regular pay periods and imposing time 
limitations for payments due. Moreover, 
the broader policy goal served by these 
functions is the maintenance of economic 
stability and industrial peace. 
The wage payment and collection law is 
important because a person who renders 
services in exchange for a promise of wages 
or other compensation is entitled to be 
assured that such payment will be made. 
Otherwise, significant social and economic 
problems would result from inadequate 
protection of such a basic right. In order 
for this right to be sufficiently protected, it 
is necessary that effective legal mechanisms 
exist which guarantee the prompt and 
timely payment of wages, or in the alterna-
tive, provide efficient and reliable means 
for the collection of wages unlawfully 
withheld. 
For these reasons, most states have 
enacted wage payment and collection laws 
designed to address these problems and 
needs. Such laws provide various legal 
remedies, including liquidated or treble 
damages, criminal penalties and attorney's 
fees, which ensure the protection of 
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employee rights and deter employer mis-
conduct. Additionally, the statutory 
schemes created by these laws often pro-
vide for both private and governmental 
enforcement. 
The objective of this article is to provide 
a critical, yet constructive, analysis and 
evaluation of the Maryland Wage Payment 
and Collection Law, with an eye toward 
amending the law to make it more effec-
tive in accomplishing its intended purpose. 
In pursuit of this objective, the Maryland 
law will be compared and contrasted to 
similar wage collection statutes enacted by 
other states. The effectiveness of a wage 
collection law can best be evaluated by a 
review of the judicial decisions arising 
under the statute which interpret the law 
and seek to carry out its intent. According-
ly, the case law which has arisen under 
these statutes will be reviewed in order to 
examine how such laws operate in prac-
tice. Upon such a review, it will become 
clear that the success of any wage collec-
tion law depends, to a significant extent, 
upon the particular mix of rights, remedies 
and enforcement mechanisms provided for 
in the statutory scheme selected. 
When the Maryland statute is compared 
with other wage collection laws, it 
becomes clear that the Maryland law con-
tains a number of critical shortcomings 
and deficiencies which seriously limit and 
impair its effectiveness. In order to rectify 
what appear to be the most significant of 
these problems, it is submitted that three 
specific admendments to the Maryland 
statute should be adopted: 
(1) the statute should expressly provide 
employees with a private right'of action to 
enforce the provisions of the statute; 
(2) the statute should permit any 
employee who prevails in a private action 
the right to recover reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs; and 
(3) the statute should provide that where 
the employer is a corporation, corporate 
officers should be subject to personal lia-
bility for violations of the law committed 
in the corporate name. 
It is further submitted that enactment of 
these amendments will help ensure that 
the underlying goals and policies of the 
statute are better served. Without such 
revisions, the rights of employees, as set 
forth in the statute, are not likely to be 
forcefully and adequately protected. 
Without effective enforcement, the rights 
and guarantees the statute purports to hold 
out become no more than empty "paper" 
promises. 
Analysis 
A. The Mechanics of the Maryland Act 
The Maryland Wage Payment and Col-
lection Law, Md. Ann. Code, art. 100, §94 
(1985), defines the rights of employees and 
the duties and responsibilities of employ-
ers with respect to the payment and collec-
tion of wages. Subsection (a)(3) of the 
statute defines wages as "any remunera-
tion, compensation, bonus, commission, 
and! or fringe benefit promised in return 
for services by an employee." The statute 
further provides that such "wages" shall 
be paid by the employer, with some excep-
tions, "at least once every two weeks" and 
imposes certain time limits as to when pay-
ment must be made "upon [an employee's] 
termination of employment." §94(b) and 
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(e)} Additionally, the law obligates the 
employer to meet certain notice require-
ments with respect to changes in rates of 
pay and it restricts the employer's ability 
to effect deductions from an employee's 
wages. §94{c) and (d). 
In the event an employer fails to comply 
with these provisions, an injured employee 
may seek redress by filing a complaint 
with the Commissioner of Labor and 
Industry. If it is determined that the com-
plaint has merit, the commissioner may 
attempt to resolve it through informal 
means, such as mediation, or may request 
civil prosecution from the Attorney Gen-
eral. §94{g){1) and (2). Where a civil action 
is brought on behalf of an employee, the 
statute provides that the court may "award 
an employee up to [three] times the 
amount of wages unlawfully withheld." 
§94(g){2).2 Additionally, §94{f){1) of the 
statute provides that criminal penalties 
may be imposed against an employer who 
"willfully violates the provisions" of the 
statute.3 Thus, on its face, the statute 
appears to provide the type of enforce-
ment mechanisms and sanctions necessary 
to compel compliance. It is questionable, 
however, whether in reality the Act has 
been successful in accomplishing its goal. 
Since the original passage of the Wage Pay-
ment and Collection Law in 1966, there 
has not been a civil or criminal lawsuit 
brought under it. It is possible that the 
reason this law has never been utilized is 
due to some super-effective deterrent capa-
bility. It is also possible that all Maryland 
employers are simply law-abiding citizens 
who always pay all their employees on 
time and in full. In reality, however, it is 
highly unlikely that either of these 
explanations is true. 
While the argument that the law may 
have a significant deterrent effect is not 
without merit, it is still not plausible that 
this possibility alone explains why, for 
over twenty years, the statute has been a 
stranger to the judicial arena. Regardless of 
the severity of the sanctions, there will 
always be those who risk penalty for pro-
fit. Moreover, assuming arguendo, that the 
Commissioner of Labor and Industry has 
been highly successful in settling wage dis-
putes through informal processes, it is 
extremely unlikely that every valid wage 
claim has been disposed of in this manner. 
More realistically, it appears that 
Maryland's Wage Payment and Collection 
Law has simply been ineffective in assist-
ing injured workers to recover compensa-
tion unlawfully withheld! Thus, in light 
of the above facts, it· would not be 
unfounded or illogical to conclude that a 
subtantial number of injuries of the type 
intended to be prevented by the Act are 
not being redressed.s 
B. The Maryland Act in Perspective 
The persuasiveness of the above argu-
ment is further strengthened when the 
Maryland statute is compared with the 
wage collection statutes of other states. A 
vast majority of the states in this country 
have some type of wage payment and col-
lection law. Moreover, many of these stat-
utes provide for civil and criminal 
penalties which are as severe, if not more 
so, than those afforded by the Maryland 
statute. Additionally, most statutory 
schemes created by such laws provide for 
"Since the ... passage 
of the Wage Payment 
and Collection 
Law. .. there has not 
been not a single 
l . " awsuzt . ... 
state enforcement, as well as various alter-
natives for the informal resolution of wage 
claims. Notwithstanding such similarities, 
however, a significant amount of case law 
exists under virtually every other state stat-
ute.6 
With these factors in mind, why has the 
Maryland law never been litigated? The 
argument set forth above suggests that the 
very non-existence of case law under the 
Maryland statute provides sufficient 
grounds to question the law's effectiveness. 
The non-existence of litigation involving 
the Maryland statute becomes even more 
troublesome, however, in light of the fact 
that other state laws, which afford similar 
remedies and penalties, have given rise to 
a significant amount of litigation. 
If the non-use of the Maryland law is due 
to some deterrent effect, why have other 
state statutes (some of which provide for 
even more severe sanctions) not produced 
such results? If the non-use of the 
Maryland law is due to an unusually high 
degree of succcess achieved by the Com-
missioner of Labor and Industry, why 
have other state enforcement agencies not 
been so effective? 
The answer to these questions is not that 
the Maryland statute possesses some u-
nique formula or magic not contained in 
other state statutes. Rather, the reason the 
Maryland law has been such a stranger to 
the courts is due to the manner in which 
it is dissimilar to the statutory schemes ere-
ated by other wage collection laws. The 
Maryland law does not contain a number 
of key provisions included in most other 
state wage laws, provisions which make 
legal action both a more realistic alterna-
tive and a more effective weapon. 
The key ingredients missing in the 
enforcement scheme created by the 
Maryland law are: (1) the right of an 
employee to bring a private cause of 
action; (2) the right of an employee to 
recover attorney's fees in such an action; 
and (3) the right to obtain recovery against 
corporate officers for willful violations of 
the law. Most other state wage collection 
laws include such provisions. Morerover, 
these rights and remedies are usually made 
available in addition to other enforcement 
provisions, such as those provided in the 
Maryland statute, i.e. treble or liquidated 
damages, criminal penalties, informal dis-
pute resolution and state enforcement. 
C. The Maryland Statute v. Wage Col-
lection Laws of Other States 
While similar to the Maryland law in 
many respects, the Pennsylvania Wage 
Payment and Collection Law, Pa. Stat. 
Ann., tit. 43, §260.1-11a (Purden 1964 & 
Supp. 1988), also includes provisions 
which allow for both a private right of 
action and the recovery of attorney's fees. 
Section 26O.9a(a) of the Act provides that 
"[a]ny employee or group of employees, 
labor organization or party to whom any 
type of wages is payable may institute 
actions under this act." Furthermore, 
§260.9a(f) mandates that in such private 
civil actions, "the court. .. shall in addi-
tion to any judgment awarded to the plain-
tiff or plaintiffs, allow costs for reasonable 
attorney's fees of any nature to be paid by 
the defendant." 
Although the Pennsylvania law does not 
expressly state that corporate officers are 
liable for violations committed in the 
name of the corporation, the law has been 
interpreted to allow for such personal lia-
bility. The basis relied upon by the courts 
for imposing liability upon corporate offi-
cers has been the statute's definition of 
"employer", which, for purposes of the 
act, "[i]ncludes every person, firm, part-
nership, association, corporation, or ... 
any agent or officer of any of the above 
mentioned classes employing any person 
in the [state]." §260.2a. See Amalgamated 
Cotton Garment and Allied Indus. Fund 'tI. 
Dion, 341 Pa. Super. 12, 491 A.2d 123 
(1985).7 
It is significant that the Pennsylvania sta-
tute provides for these rights and remedies 
in addition to: (1) state enforcement (in-
cluding informal dispute resolution), 
(§255.2), liquidated damages (§260.10) and 
criminal penalites (§260.11a). It is thus 
apparent that the Pennsylvania legislature 
believes that a more comprehensive statu-
tory scheme is necessary to ensure the full 
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and adequate protection of employee 
rights. Pennsylvania is not the only state 
which has taken a more comprehensive 
approach to the vigorous enforcement of 
wage payment and collection laws. 
Indeed, by way of example, it is interest-
ing to note that the District of Columbia's 
Payment and Collection of Wages Act, 
D.C. Code Ann., §§36-101-110 (1988), 
closely parallels the statutory scheme cre-
ated by the Pennsylvania law. Thus, in 
addition to providing for liquidated 
damages, criminal penalties and govern-
mental enforcement, the District of 
Columbia act gives emplyees the right to 
bring private civil actions under the statute 
(D.C. Code Ann. §38-108 (a», and allows 
for attorney's fees in such actions (D.C. 
Code Ann. §38-108(b». It also defines 
"employer" to include both corporations 
and individuals (D.C. Code Ann. §36-
101(1» (emphasis added). 
In addition to the wage payment and col-
lection laws for Pennsylvania and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, numerous other state 
wage statutes contain provisions which 
allow for private civil actions, attorney's 
fees and personal liability of corporate offi-
cers. See e.g., N.Y. Lab. Law, §§190-199 
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988); Cal. Lab. 
Code, §§203-270 (West 1971 & Supp. 
1988); Iowa Code Ann. §91a. 1-13 (1984 & 
Supp. 1988); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann., 
§275.42-56 (1986); and Haw. Rev. Stat., 
§388-1-13 (1985). 
Upon reviewing these and other similar 
wage collection statutes and the body of 
case law which has emerged from such sta-
tutes, it becomes evident that certain pro-
visions such as a private cause of action, 
the right to attorney's fees, and personal 
liability of corporate officers are key ingre-
dients to a successful wage collection 
scheme. It is significant that a large percen-
tage of the cases arising under such statutes 
have been brought by private parties, 
rather than by state agencies. Moreover, 
plaintiffs in such cases have been highly 
successful in recovering not only compen-
sation unlawfully withheld, but also attor-
ney's fees and liquidated damages as well. 
Additionally, in a substantial number of 
cases, employees have succeeded in utiliz-
ing these laws to impose personal liability 
upon corporate officers who might have 
otherwise escaped liability if the plain-
tiff/employee had been strictly confined 
to common law remedies.8 
In view of these facts, it seems clear that 
the right to bring a private civil action, 
recover attorney's fees and obtain personal 
liability against corporate officers are all 
essential ingredients for an efficient and 
effective wage collection law. The sections 
which follow examine each of these princi-
ples in light of statutory provisions which 
embody them and judicial decisions which 
interpret their meaning and give them 
effect. 
D. The Case for Allowing a Private 
Cause of Action 
1. Basic Facts and Principles 
The argument set forth above contends 
that the Maryland Wage Payment and Col-
lection Statute would be more effective if 
it was amended to provide for a private 
cause of action.9 The arguments in support 
of such an amendment are based upon 
sound logic and plain common sense. Mor-
eover, because this type of provision is a 
common feature and central ingredient in 
the wage collection schemes for a signifi-
cant number of other states, it is clear that 
the practical wisdom of this approach is 
well recognized. 
"Allowing private 
enforcement . .. 
guarantees that the 
state will accomplish 
more for less." 
Allowing for private enforcement of 
wage collection laws virtually guarantees 
that the state will accomplish more for 
less. Less state resources would be needed 
because private actions would supplement 
state enforcement efforts. Additionally, 
more widespread and comprehensive 
enforcement would be assured because any 
employee could invoke the protection of 
the law, without depending upon the 
approval and support of the Commission-
er of Labor and Industry. 
Even assuming that the Division of 
Labor and Industry was willing to pursue 
and litigate every legitimate wage claim, 
such a task would be impossible. Under 
the present statutory scheme, the Commis-
sioner has the responsibility for providing 
investigative and enforcement services for 
the entire state. Thus, at least in theory, 
this responsibility extends to thousands 
upon thousands of employment relation-
ships. Such a scheme is clearly unworkable 
and, therefore, it is not surprising that the 
wage collection laws of many states 
expressly authorize enforcement through 
private civil actions.l° 
In considering whether a private cause of 
action should exist under a statute, it is 
helpful to focus on the underlying purpose 
of the law and the policies it is intended to 
serve. By this approach, it may be deter-
mined whether private enforcement 
would better effectuate the purposes of the 
statute, or conversely, whether it would 
cause undue interference with administra-
tion of the law by the state. Because no 
case law exists under the Maryland statute, 
it is necessary to look to judicial interpre-
tations of other state statutes to attempt to 
ascertain the legislative purpose of the 
Maryland law. I I 
2. Private Enforcement v. Employer 
Economic Superiority 
In Ressler v. Jones Motor Co., 337 Pa. 
Super. 602, 487 A.2d 424 (1985), the legisla-
tive purpose of the Pennsylvania Wage 
Payment and Collection Law was explain-
ed in terms of both the employee rights to 
be protected and the employer conduct to 
be discouraged. The court held that the 
central aim of the statute was to "aid an 
employee in the prompt collection of com-
pensation due him and to discourage an 
employer from using a position of 
economic superiority as a lever to dissuade 
an employee from promptly collecting his 
agreed compensation." ld. at 610, 487 A.2d 
at 429, (quoting, State ex reI. Nilson v. Ore· 
gon State Motor Ass'n., 248 Or. 133, 138, 
432 P.2d 512, 515 (1967». Borrowing from 
an interpretation of New York's wage col-
lection law, the Ressler coun further stated 
that "the purpose of statutes of this nature 
is to effect a quick payment of wages of 
compensation due in order to undercut 
any position of economic superiority 
possessed by the employer." ld. at 611, 487 
A.2d at 429, (citing, Weingrad v. Fischer & 
Porter Co., 47 D & C.2d 244, 251 (C.c.P. 
Bucks Co. 1968). 
Likewise, it may be concluded that one 
of the primary goals of the Maryland act is 
to "equalize" the superior economic posi-
tion of employers vis-a-vis their employ-
ees. It is clearly evident that this purpose 
would be better served by allowing for the 
private enforcement of wage claims. By 
giving employees the right to take inde-
pendent legal action and recover not only 
compensation due, but liquidated damages 
and attorney's fees, the employee is placed 
upon a more equal footing with his 
employer. 
If a party does not have the right to 
bring a private enforcement action and is 
unable to obtain the suppon of the state, 
he remains essentially at the mercy of the 
employer. 12 In order to effectively equalize 
the economic superiority of the employer, 
it is necessary for the employee to have the 
right to bring a private cause of action. 
Only in this way can the rights of the 
employee be forcefully protected and the 
intent of the statute be fully carried out. 
3. Private Enforcement to Augment the 
Law's Deterrent Effect 
Where a wage collection statute author-
izes private enforcement, such suits are 
usually encouraged to a great extent by the 
availability of liquidated damages or other 
20-TheLawForum/l~3------------------------------------------------------------------------
similar remedies. The intended purpose of 
allowing such remedies is to deter viola-
tions of the law. It is hoped that the deter-
rent effect will compel compliance with 
the law and thereby avoid the need for the 
use of any types of enforcement actions. 
In discussing the legislative intent of a 
provision permitting treble damages under 
California's wage collection law (Cal. Lab. 
Code, §206(b)(West 1971 & Supp. 1988), 
the court stated that "[t]he intention of the 
penalty imposed by the act in question is 
to make it in the interest of the employer 
to keep faith with his employees and thus 
avoid injury to them and possible injury to 
the public at large." Triad Data Services v. 
Jackson, 153 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1,10, 200 
Cal. Rptr. 418,422 (1984) (quoting Moore 
v. Indiana Spring Channel Gold Mining 
Co., 37 Cal. App. 370, 380, 174 P. 378 
(1918)). Similarly, the purpose of a provi-
sion in Hawaii's wage law (Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§388-10 (1985) which mandates that cer-
tain civil penalties be awarded to the 
employee was found to have been intend-
ed to "encourage employers to pay wage 
promptly, reduce employee's economic 
losses, and strengthen the law." A rimizu v. 
Financial Sec. Ins. Co., 5 Haw. App. 106, 
679 P.2d 627, 631 (1984). 
These types of remedies provide a signifi-
cant deterrent effect against non-
compliance. The benefit of this approach 
has been recognized by the Maryland legis-
lature because section 94(g)(2) of the sta-
tute allows an injured employee the right 
to recover up to three times the amount of 
compensation owed. Under the Maryland 
law, however, the right to bring a private 
action to enforce a wage claim does not 
exist. Thus, a treble damage award would 
only be available in a civil action brought 
by the State. 
While it must be conceded that the very 
existence of these types of penalty provi-
sions do serve to deter unlawful conduct to 
some degree, the effectiveness of such a 
deterrent is substantially undermined 
when the ability to enforce the law and 
impose penalties rests entirely with the 
state. The success of any penalty, in terms 
of its deterrent effect, .cannot depend sole-
ly upon its mere existence; the effec-
tiveness of a sanction is also determined by 
its availability and use. If a penalty of this 
sort if not readily available or is rarely 
invoked, its credibility is significantly 
weakened. This is especially true where, as 
is the case with the Maryland law, the sta-
tute and its penalties have never been 
tested or proven. 
In view of the above, it is submitted that 
in order for the treble damages provision 
of the Maryland statute to have any real 
force, private enforcement of the statute 
must be permitted. Greater availability of 
this sanction would surely bolster the cred-
ibility of the law and thereby enhance its 
deterrent effect. Additionally, in terms of 
both safeguarding employee rights and 
deterring employer misconduct, the right 
to bring a private action under the statute 
would make the law more effective 
because it would allow for more wide-
spread and comprehensive enforcement. In 
sum, it seems clear that it would be consis-
tent with the purposes of the Maryland 
statute to allow for private enforcement 
because it would unquestionably serve to 
better protect employee rights and more 
effectively deter unlawful conduct. 
E. The Case for Awarding Attorney's 
Fees 
In order for a private right of action to 
exist as a viable option, it is essential that 
the prevailing party be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees and any inciden-
tal costs of litigation. Otherwise, injured 
employees would be deterred from pursu-
ing valid wage claims because of the often 
high, and in many cases prohibitive, costs 
of litigation. 
Although it could be argued that civil 
remedies, such as liquidated or treble 
damages, would alone be sufficient to com-
pensate injured employees, the better view 
is that allowing both attorney's fees and 
penalties provides for a more effective and 
forceful wage collection law. Moreover, 
such provisions are intended to serve dif-
ferent purposes. Punitive or liquidated 
damages are meant to deter future viola-
tions of the law, while an award of attor-
ney's fees is intended to reimburse an 
injured employee for costs expended in lit-
igation. /ves v. Manchester Subaru, Inc., 126 
N.H. 796, 498 A.2d 297,303 (1985); see also 
Mayday v. Elview·Stewart Sys. Co., 324 
N.W. 2d 467 (Iowa, 1962). It is not surpris-
ing that most wage collection laws 
"for private . .. action 
to exist . .. it is 
essential that the 
prevailing party . .. 
recover attorney's 
fi " ees . ... 
which authorize private enforcement 
allow for the recovery of attorney's fees in 
addition to compensatory and punitive 
damages.1J 
Where wage collection laws provide for 
attorney's fees, it is usuall stipulated that 
the award of fees is mandatory, rather than 
discretionary. Thus, because of the impor-
tance of such rights, many state legislatures 
have determined that where an employee 
is forced to litigate in order to recover 
wages unlawfully withheld, an award of 
attorney's fees is unquestionably appro-
priate and, therefore, is not a matter for 
judicial discretion. 14 
Moreover, as a general point, courts have 
interpreted attorney's fees provisions in 
wage collection laws as essential for pro-
tecting employee rights and deterring 
employer misconduct. See e.g., Curry'll. 
Sutherland, 111 W.L.R. 1613 (D.c. Super. 
Ct. 1983); Garvin'll. Timber Cutters, Inc., 
61 Or. App. 497, 658 P.2d 1164 (1983). It 
is clear that the right to recover attorney's 
fees is a fundamental prerequisite to an 
effective and efficient wage collection 
scheme. 
F. The Case for Personal Liability of 
Corporate Officers 
1. Underlying Principles and Theories of 
Liabilities 
The third major significant difference 
between the Maryland statute and wage 
collection laws of other states is that the 
Maryland law does not provide for the 
imposition of personal liability against cor-
porate officers or agents. Because the offi-
cers of a corporation are not, as a matter of 
general corporate law, usually liable for 
the debts or obligations of a corporation, 
this issue presents perhaps the most sensi-
tive and difficult question of all. The suc-
cessful collection or enforcement of a wage 
claim can often depend upon the availabili-
ty of such liability and therefore, this issue 
may also be the most important. 
Despite the well-recognized virtues and 
benefits of the normally all powerful cor-
porate shield, many wage collection 
schemes allow for the imposition of indi-
vidual liability against corporate officers. 
The reason for this noted exception in the 
area of wage payment and collection may 
be attributed to the fact that these statutes, 
like the doctrine of limited corporate lia-
bility, are also based upon important pub-
lic policy considerations. Thus, the 
particular design of a wage collection law 
with respect to such liability provisions 
inevitably requires a delicate legislative act 
of balancing conflicting and competing 
rights and needs. 
There are essentially two versions of 
provisions allowing for the personalliabili-
ty of corporate officers in the area of wage 
payment and collection. The first involves 
a more demanding standard because it 
requires the plaintiff to show that the cor-
porate officer acted knowingly and in 
wilful violation of the law. The second, 
and more liberal, version, imposes a type 
of strict liability upon corporate officials 
and holds them responsible for unpaid 
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wages regardless of fault or intent. 
Although the wage collection statutes of 
most states allow for personal liability to 
some extent, it seems that the dominant 
trend is to use the higher standard and 
require conduct of an intentional or will-
ful nature. 
Regardless of the standard for such liabil-
ity, the intended purpose of these types of 
provisions remains the same-to ensure 
that workers receive their due compensa-
tion. More specifically, it has been held 
that the legislative purpose of such provi-
sions was to make those responsible for 
the expenditure of corporate funds person-
ally liable for the payment of wages. Labor· 
ers Combined Funds v. Mattei, 359 Pa. 
Super. 399, 518 A.2d 1296 (1986). Moreo-
ver, liability provisions of this sort may be 
viewed as creating a type of insurance to 
employees, wherein "the officers of the 
corporation are in effect guarantors of 
[wage] payment." Sasso v. Millbrook 
Enters., 108 Misc.2d 562, 438 N.Y.2d 59, 
62 (1981). 
2. Strict Liability for Corporate Officers 
The Pennsylvania Wage Payment and 
Collection Act includes a provision which 
imposes a type of strict liability against 
corporate officers solely because of their 
position in the corporation. The basis for 
imposing personal liability against corpo-
rate officers under the Pennsylvania act 
lies in the statute's definition of employer 
which states that an "employer" shall 
include "every person, firm, partnership 
association, corporation ... and any agent 
or officer of any of the above-mentioned 
classes employing any person in this Com-
monwealth." Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 43, §260.2a 
(Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988). 
In applying this section, the Penn-
sylvania courts have held that the statute 
does not require a finding of intent, i.e., 
that the violation of the law was due to 
wilful conduct. Amalgamated Cotton Gar· 
ment & Allied Indus. Fund v. Dion, 341 Pa. 
Super. 12, 491 A.2d 123, 124-125 (1985). 
Rather, this provision has been viewed as 
imposing a type of strict liability because 
personal liability attaches against corpo-
rate officers immediately upon non-
payment, regardless of whether such 
non-payment was an intentional or willful 
violation of the law. See, Laborers Com· 
bined Funds, 359 Pa. Super. at 407, 518 
A.2d at 1299-1301. This liability has also 
been described as a type of contract liabili-
ty where the intent of a party is irrelevant 
to the existence of a contractual breach. Id. 
at 409 n.5, 518 A.2d at 1301 n.5. 
It is clear that the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture, and other states (e.g. Vermont and 
the District of Columbia) which have 
taken this approach, made a deliberate 
choice to provide substantial protection 
for the wage rights of employees, at the 
expense of a significant exception to the 
doctrine of limited corporate liability. 
Unquestionably, the sanction of strict lia-
bility gives the law powerful force and 
effect. The benefit is that employees do 
not have to demonstrate that the employ-
er's conduct was intentional in nature, 
only that wages were not paid. Addition-
ally, the severity of this sanction is likely 
to compel corporate officers to take wage 
payment responsibilities seriously and 
avoid violations of the law at all costs. For 
these reasons, thIS version of the personal 
liability of corporate officers should be 
incorporated into the Maryland statute. 
Because the dominant trend among most 
states, however, is to opt for the more 
limited version of personal liability, the 
requirement of willfulness or intent should 
also be examined in order that a balanced 
perspective be presented. 
3. Liability for Willful of Intentional 
Violations 
Most states which permit personalliabil-
ity to be imposed against corporate officers 
for wage violations require the employee 
to show that the alleged conduct was of a 
willful or intentional nature. For example, 
"the dominant trend 
.. . is ... for the more 
limited version of 
personal liability" 
New Jersey act provides for such liability 
where the employer/officer "knowingly 
and willfully fails or refuses to make 
[wage] payments." N.J. Stat. Ann. §2a:170-
90.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988). Such 
requirements have been interpreted to 
mean conduct which is "purposeful and 
knowledgeable." State v. Wein, 80 N.J. 
491, 404 A.2d 302 (1979). This require-
ment is met when a showing is made that 
"[a]n employer ... having the financial 
ability to pay wages which he knows he 
owes, fails to pay them." Hekker v. Sabre 
Constr. Co., 265 Or. 552, 510 P.2d 347,351 
(1971) (quoting State ex. rei. Nilson v. Lee, 
251 Or. 284, 293, 444 P.2d 548, 553 
(1968». It has also been held that such lia-
bility should not attach where the non-
payment is "based upon bona fide" 
dispute as to the vafidity of a wage claim. 
Id. In this context, "willful" does not 
require any type of malice, but only 
requires that "the thing done or omitted to 
be done was done or omitted intentional-
ly." Weinzirl v. Wells Group, Inc., 234 
Kan. 1016, 677 P.2d 1004, 1010 (1984) 
(quoting State ex. reL Nilson v. Johnston, 
233 Or. 103, 108, 377, P.2d 331 (1962)) 
The essence of this standard has been 
interpreted to mean that personal liability 
can be imposed against corporate officers 
when such individuals "knowingly permit 
the corporation to violate [the law]." Ives 
at 796, 498 A.2d at 303. Neither mistake or 
inadvertence will suffice. Rather, an affir-
mative showing is required that demon-
strates that the officers of the corporation, 
having the ability to pay, knowingly and 
intentionally refused or failed to do so. Id. 
Although this version of a personal lia-
bility provision imposes a substantial bur-
den upon the injured employee, it can still 
be a fairly effective mechanism for collect-
ing unpaid wages and deterring employer 
misconduct. Moreover, because this ver-
sion represents the more dominant trend, 
its popularity is likely to be somewhat per-
suasive. Regardless of which standard is 
applied, it is clear that the effective 
enforcement of wage claims often depends 
upon the availability of this type of 
remedy. The right to impose personal lia-
bility against corporate officers in the area 
of wage collection is of critical importance 
because a significant number of legitimate 
wage claims arise in situations where the 
corporate entity is experiencing financial 
difficulties. Still, corporate officers are nev-
ertheless able to reap profits or convert 
assets for their own benefit. For these 
reasons it is clear that such a provision rep-
resents a key ingredient in a successful 
wage collection scheme. 
G. Federal Preemption Issues 
A significant problem involving the use 
and effectiveness of state wage collection 
laws not discussed above concerns the 
broad preemptive powers of federal labor 
and employment law. Specifically, the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
29 U.S.c. §8141-187 (1982 & Supp. 1986) 
("LMRA") and the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.c. 
§81001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1986) 
("ERISA") provide that state law in the 
areas covered by these respective statutes is 
preempted. 
ERISA 15 was enacted by Congress to 
protect employees from "abuses in the 
administration and investment of private 
retirement plans and employee welfare 
plans." Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 
1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982). Thus, where 
an employer fails to make fringe benefit 
contributions pursuant to a benefit plan 
covered by ERISA, employees may bring 
an action under the statute and are entitled 
to the rights and remedies provided there-
in. 16 In addition, state law may provide 
remedies in such cases in that many state 
wage collection acts also extend to fringe 
benefit contributions. 17 
With respect to benefit contributions 
covered by ERISA, reliance on state law is 
expressly foreclosed. The relevant preemp-
tion clause, 29 U.S.c. §1144{a), states that 
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the provisions of the statute "shall super· 
sede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan" covered by the Act. (empha-
sis added). Accordingly, where state collec-
tion laws have been relied upon to recover 
benefit contributions, such claims will be 
preempted where federal law (of which 
ERISA is a part) is shown to be applicable. 
See e.g. Nat'l Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 
F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986). 
The Labor Management Relations Act 
has also been found to have a preemptive 
effect upon state law. Preemption in this 
context, has been the result of judicial 
interpretation, rather than express legisla-
tive mandate. Section 301 of the LMRA, 
29 U.S:c. §185, gives the parties to collec-
tive bargaining agreements the right to sue 
in federal court to enforce the terms of 
such contracts. 18 The federal remedy creat-
ed by Section ,301 is exclusive.19 Thus, 
actions to enforce collective bargaining 
agreements must be based on federal law, 
not state law. Textile Workers v. Lincoln 
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).20 Accord-
ingly, where an employer fails to pay 
wages due under a collective bargaining 
agreement, a right exists to seek payment 
through a Section 301 enforcement action, 
and remedies provided by state wage col-
lection laws are foreclosed.21 
It seems clear that an action brought 
under a state wage collection law for fail-
ure to make wage payments or fringe bene-
fits contributions may be effectively 
precluded by an argument based on federal 
preemption. While it is fair to say that the 
majority view favors preemption, some 
courts have nevertheless held that the 
scope and reach of the federal law is not so 
pervasive as to preclude all state actions. 
According to this view, it is possible for a 
state wage collection mechanism to co-
exist with the federal remedies created by 
ERISA and the LMRA without undue 
interference with exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the effect of federal preemp-
tion in this area is not entirely clear and 
some dissension exists among authorities 
who have addressed the issue. 
With respect to the minority view, most 
of the cases have confronted issues involv-
ing the effect of ERISA rather than the 
LMRA. These decisions hold that ERISA 
does not necessarily always preempt state 
wage and benefit claims and that, despite 
the existence of federal preemption in this 
area, it is possible for federal and state 
remedies to co-exist. The basis for such 
holdings is an exception to ERISA's 
preemption clause, which provides that 
the preemption clause "shall not apply to 
any generally applicable criminal law of a 
state." 29 U.S.c. §1144(b)(4) (emphasis 
added). 
Whether the exception provided by 
§1144(b)(4) can be relied upon in order to 
uphold a state action for criminal penalties 
ultimately depends on how a court inter-
prets the meaning of the phrase "any gen-
erally applicable criminal law." Most 
courts which have addressed the issue have 
found that wage and/or benefit collection 
laws, such as the type which exist in 
Maryland, are not "generally applicable 
criminal laws," because such statutes per-
tain only to wages and benefits. It is rea-
soned, therefore, that they cannot be the 
type which Congress intended to include 
within the exemption. Accordingly, under 
the majority view, such laws are preemp-
ted by ERISA, notwithstanding the fact 
that they provide for criminal sanctions.22 
"state collection 
laws . .. will be 
preempted where 
federal law is 
.. . applicable. " 
A minority view exists which holds that 
ERISA does not preempt state wage and 
benefit statutes when such laws give rise to 
criminal penalties. According to this view, 
any state law which sanctions criminal 
prosecution is a "generally applicable 
criminal law" under § 1144(b X 4) of ERISA 
and consequently is not preempted. Such 
holdings persist, despite the fact that the 
state laws are specifically designed to cover 
only the nonpayment of wages and bene-
fits. See Upholsterers Intern. Union v. Pon· 
tiac Furniture, 647 F.supp 1053 (C.O. Ill. 
1986); Sasso v. Vochris, 116 Misc.2d 797, 
456 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1982). 
Another view attempts to strike some-
what of a middle ground on the issue. In 
Nat'l Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d at 
828-29 (7th Cir. 1986), the court noted in 
dicta that while ERISA and the LMRA 
would usually preclude enforcement of 
state wage payment acts when collective 
bargaining agreements are involved, 
preemption may not exist where nonpay-
ment "is in such patent bad faith as to par-
take of the wrongfulness associated with 
some of the traditional common law inten-
tional torts .... " The suggestion seems to 
be that such circumstances might put the 
wrongful act outside the scope of federal 
labor law. This logic has a certain appeal, 
and given the appropriate facts, it could 
conceivably be sufficient to persuade a 
court from foreclosing a state action on 
preemption grounds. 
In sum, while authority exists to support 
both viewpoints, the majority position is 
likely to continue to dominate. Due to the 
broad preemptive force of federal law in 
this area, state wage collection actions are 
likely to be preempted where ERISA or 
the LMRA is found to apply. Regardless of 
the final outcome of the preemption issue, 
however, state wage collection laws will 
continue to playa vital and significant role 
in those areas of labor relations when fed-
eral law is not applicable. Where benefits 
owed to an employee are not covered by 
ERISA, or wages due are not pursuant to 
a collective bargain~ng agreement govern-
ed by the LMRA, state wage collection 
actions will continue to provide effective 
remedies. Indeed, for such employees, state 
wage laws may provide the only available 
relief. 
Conclusion 
In light of the foregoing analysis and 
arguments it is submitted that the 
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection 
should be revised to incorporate the 
amendments proposed herein. Such revi-
sion would unquestionably enhance the 
effectiveness of the law and serve to pro-
tect and promote .the rights and policies 
embodied in the Act. 
FOOTNOTES 
IWhile Subsection (b) appears to empha-
size the requirement of timeliness, it seems 
obvious from the entire text of the statute 
that the Act attempts to prohibit the more 
serious harm of non·payment, rather than 
just late payments. 
2In order for treble damages to be appro-
priate under the law, the "non-payment" 
cannot be the "result of a bona fide dis-
pute." §94(g)(2). 
JIn full §94(F)(1) states: "Any employer 
who wilfully violates the provisions of this 
subtitle is guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
upon conviction thereof, may be fined an 
. amount not to exceed $1,000." 
4It is not suggested that the successful reso-
lution of wage claims by the Commission-
er should be slighted, but only that a 100 
percent success rate is a virtual impossibili-
ty. Consequently, the dearth of case law 
must be attributable to other reasons. 
5The most serious types of claims which 
typically arise under wage collection laws 
usually involve disputes over the non· 
payment of wages, as opposed to untimely 
payment, unauthorized deductions, irreg-
ular pay periods, etc. Moreover, claims for 
non-payment often occur in situations 
where the employer is experiencing some 
type of financial difficulty, e.g. bankrupt-
cy, insolvency, business closing, etc. 
Under such circumstances, an employee 
who is owed several paychecks can indeed 
be left in dire straits and may be critically 
dependent upon an effective wage collec-
tion law. 
6Case law arising under state wage collec-
-----------------------------------19.3IThe Law Forum-23 
tion laws can be easily located within the 
annotations to these statutes or by 
researching a law under the appropriate 
state or regional digest. Additionally, these 
statutes have given rise to a multitude of 
lawsuits and judicial opinions. See e.g., The 
California's Wage Collection Statute, Cal. 
Lab. Code §200-270 (West 1971 & Supp. 
1988); Illinois Wage Payment & Collec-
tion Act, Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 48, para. 39 
1-15 (Smith-Hurd 1986); and Pennsylvania 
Wage Payment and Collection Law, Pa. 
Stat. Ann., tit. 43, §260.1-110 (Purdon 
1964 & Supp. 1988). Further discussion of 
such laws and specific cases arising under 
them is provided below. 
7See also Ward v. Whalen, 18 Pa. D&C.3d 
710 (1981) (corporate officer constitutes 
employer under the act and therefore is 
personally liable); In Re Johnston, 24 
Bankr. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (corporate 
officer personally liable for financial obli-
gations of corporation). 
8Examples of cases involving each of the 
statutory provisions in question are pro-
vided below. 
9While it is recommended here that the 
Maryland statute be amended to expressly 
allow for private enforcement, it is clearly 
conceivable that an implied right of action 
could be argued to exist under the law. See 
e.g., Vassallo v. Haber Elec. Co." 435 A.2d 
1046 (Del. Super. 1981) (private cause of 
action exists under Delaware's wage collec-
tion law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 29 §912(1983 
& Supp. 1988). Notwithstanding this pos-
sibility, it would nevertheless be more 
appropriate for the General Assembly to 
amend the Maryland statute to expressly 
authorize private enforcement. The chief 
benefit of this strategy is that a clear and 
unambiguous message would be sent to 
employers and employees alike. 
lO'fhe right to bring a private suit on such 
claims despite the state's refusal to pursue 
the matter may be important for a number 
of reasons. For example, the strength of a 
particular claim could be fatally underesti-
mated by the Commissioner. Addition-
ally, civil discovery may allow an 
employee to obtain the documentation 
necessary to substantiate his claim. 
- IIBecause all wage collection laws seek to 
achieve basically the same objective, i.e. 
the prompt and certain payment of wages, 
case law from other jurisdictions regarding 
the legislative intent of such statutes pro-
vides strongly persuasive authority. 
Indeed, as will be shown, it is not uncom-
mon for courts of one state to look to the 
decisions of another state in this context. 
I2While an injured employee would always 
have the right to sue in contract, in many 
instances such an action would not be pur-
sued due to the often prohibitive costs of 
litigation. Indeed, in many wage cases, it 
would not be worthwhile for an employee 
to incur the costs of a lawsuit, unless attor-
ney's fees and/or some type of liquidated 
damages were available. 
USee e.g., the wage collection laws referred 
to above for the states of Pennsylvania, the 
District of Columbia, California, New 
Hampshire, Iowa and Hawaii. 
"See e.g., the wage collection statutes for 
California Cal.L~b. Code, §98.2(bXWest 
1971 & Supp. 198-8); District of Columbia, 
D.C. Code Ann. §36-108(b)(1988), and 
Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 43, 
§260.9a(f)(Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988); 
where the operative language in such pro-
visions states that the court shall award 
attorney's fees, rather than may award 
such fees. 
15ERISA applies to employee benefit plans 
(pension and welfare) which are estab-
lished and maintained: 
(1) by any employer engaged in com-
merce or in any industry or activity 
affecting commerce; 
(2) by any employee organization or 
organization representing employees 
engaged in commerce or in any indus-
try or activity affecting commerce or 
both. 
16See 29 U.S.c. §§1131-1145. 
17See e.g. Md. Ann. Code, art. 100, §94(a)(3) 
(1983). 
'8Section 301, 29 U.S.c. §185(a) provides: 
"Suits for violation of contracts between 
an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affect-
ing commerce as defined in this [Act] ... 
may be brought in any district court of the 
United States having jurisdiction of the 
parties .... " 
19Nat'L Itfetalcra/ters 784 F.2d at 823. 
2°SeealsoAllis·Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 
U.S. 202, 220 (1985) ("when resolution of 
state law claim is substantially dependent 
upon analysis of the terms of [a collective 
bargaining agreement], that claim must 
either be treated as a §301 claim or dis-
missed as preempted by federal labor con-
tract laws"). 
21See e.g. Nat'l Metalcra/ters, 784 F .2d at 
823. 
22See Sforza v. Kenco Constr. Inc., 7 E.B.C. 
1181 (D. Conn. 1986); Sheet Metal Workers 
v. Aberdeen BSM Wkrs., 559 F.Supp. 561 
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); Calhoon v. Bonnabel, 560 
F.Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Com· 
monwealth v. Federico, 383 Mass. 485, 419 
N.E.2d 1374 (1981). See also National Car· 
riers Con! Comm. v. Hefferman, 454 
F.Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978). 
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